

# **INDEPENDENT JERSEY CARE INQUIRY**

## **ORAL SUBMISSION OF MICHAEL GRADWELL**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

- 1.1. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to present my oral submission to you this afternoon.
- 1.2. I have had an opportunity to consider the evidence that you have heard and I have provided to you my statements dated 12<sup>th</sup> November 2015 and 18<sup>th</sup> February 2016 together with providing oral evidence on 20<sup>th</sup> November 2015.
- 1.3. I do not intend to rehearse all of which I have had an opportunity to put forward on previous occasions but I hope that I can today outline those issues which I consider to be of significance for your consideration.

### **2. TERMS OF REFERENCE 12**

- 2.1. I start with term of reference 12 and confirm my view that the information available to the States of Jersey Police (“SOJP”) in 2007 was sufficient to justify the setting in train of Operation Rectangle. That information made it abundantly clear that an investigation into historic institutional child abuse was both required and necessary.
- 2.2. Within the Operation Rectangle major incident room (“MIR”) there is documentation that provides overwhelming and compelling evidence of child abuse that had occurred over many decades within the Jersey care system. Whilst I am able to do so, and unless otherwise directed, I do not propose to go into any further details as I anticipate that your finding for this particular term of reference appears to be readily apparent.

### **3. OPERATION RECTANGLE: CATEGORY A+ INVESTIGATION/ CRITICAL INCIDENT**

- 3.1. Operation Rectangle developed to such an extent that it became a category A+ investigation and a critical incident. This, in simple terms, means that Operation Rectangle became classed as the most serious level of major investigation that the police service can be expected to manage.
- 3.2. The United Kingdom police service has developed, over many years of operational learning, wide-ranging guidance and procedures to assist in managing these types of incidents. These procedures are followed by the 43 UK police forces and that had been the case for the 8 to 10 years prior to the commencement of Operation Rectangle.
- 3.3. The SOJP had not developed its own unique procedures for managing this class of investigation and everything that I saw indicated that they worked to the same policing standards as the UK. Certainly SOJP officers were trained to these UK standards.

### **4. THE SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER OF A CATEGORY A+ INVESTIGATION**

- 4.1. As a result of a review into the 2002 Soham murder investigation, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary at that time, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, made certain operational recommendations. This included that the Senior Investigating Officer ("SIO") appointed to lead the investigation into a category A+ investigation should be experienced, trained and qualified to the Professionalised Investigation Programme ("PIP") level 3 SIO standard.
- 4.2. This PIP level 3 accreditation is not gained by the simple attendance on a training course. In addition to attending SIO training, the officer has to provide extensive evidence that they have successfully managed a variety of

major investigations through the entirety of the criminal justice system. That is from the commencement of the investigation through to the conclusion of the court case and in some cases far beyond that. This evidence is assessed and critiqued at a force level and then final authorisation is granted at a national level. The officer must maintain their experience through continuous professional development and regular operational investigative deployment, otherwise the qualification lapses.

- 4.3. There was a previous system to this PIP process, where senior detective officers were required to attend the 5 modules of the Management of Serious Crime Courses (“MSCC”) in order to become an SIO.
- 4.4. The chief officer of SOJP, Mr. Graham Power, appointed Mr. Leonard Harper as the SIO to lead the Operation Rectangle investigation. He was not qualified to the PIP level 3 standard. Not only that but he had not qualified to the SIO standards that existed in the decade prior to the PIP standard. Wiltshire police summarised this situation as (WD008273/79): -

*“DCO Harper had not undertaken the role of SIO for 16 years before Operation Rectangle and was untrained in both the current Professionalising Investigations Programme accreditation process, and in the previous system of modular training for each aspect of major crime investigation. By his own admission his CID days ended in the early 1990’s and he had never attended an SIO course. His is not a case of outdated training, rather one of no current training whatsoever. DCO Harper’s background is such that he could not legitimately lay claim to being considered a qualified SIO on the basis of prior acquired experience referred to as ‘Grandfathers Rights’ in SIO accreditation terms.”*

- 4.5 This SIO appointment did not meet the policing standards that applied in 2008 and a lot of the problems that arose from Operation Rectangle emanate from this specific issue.

## **5. THE STATES OF JERSEY POLICE**

- 5.1. SOJP's management approach to Operation Rectangle varied significantly from the approaches outlined within UK recommended Association of Chief Police Officer ("ACPO") best practice and guidance. An example of this variance is the decision to investigate Operation Rectangle as a single agency investigation without the use of a gold group or indeed a clear command structure.
- 5.2. I do understand and appreciate that the chief officers of SOJP had genuinely held concerns about working in partnership with other agencies. However, these concerns and their extent should have been properly evidenced and documented.
- 5.3. In my view, partnership working could have been progressed by using a risk/threat assessment process for individuals put forward to work on the gold group or as part of inter-agency co-operation. Even if this proved unsuccessful, it should at least have been attempted.
- 5.4. The partnership approach of all relevant agencies working in a collaborative manner and to clear terms of reference would have provided a higher quality of service to the victims and the people of Jersey. The SOJP narrative in relation to Operation Rectangle presented a view that prosecutors and the other agencies could not be trusted and in effect were working in opposition to the police (WD000807). The SOJP media narrative reinforced this view as the number of victims coming forward increased. Instead of reinforcing this distrust better attempts should have been made to rectify this view.
- 5.5. Also, greater attempts could and should have been made at bringing together the agencies to provide a co-ordinated response to the issues being uncovered. Unfortunately, instead of a united goal, there were divisive splits within the police and between the police and the other agencies.

## **6. THE CHANGE IN COMMAND AND MY APPOINTMENT**

- 6.1. From August 2008, Mr. David Warcup became the deputy chief officer of SOJP. He was an experienced ACPO officer, independent from Jersey and was accustomed to working to the UK policing procedures. He became the gold commander of Operation Rectangle and convened a gold group, consisting of senior people from various agencies to assist with the strategic co-ordination of the operation.
- 6.2. In September 2008, I was appointed the SIO of Operation Rectangle.
- 6.3. I was entirely independent of Jersey. Whilst I had never met Mr. Warcup prior to the interview process for this SIO role, my understanding of the UK policing procedures that were relevant to the management of Operation Rectangle mirrored those of Mr. Warcup.
- 6.4. Prior to the appointment of Mr. Warcup, the command and control structures used by SOJP to manage Operation Rectangle, varied greatly from the relevant standards of 2008, or the previous decade and the relevant evidence of this is set out in some detail within the report produced by Wiltshire police (WD007874).
- 6.5. I applied for the secondment to SOJP as a result of seeing an advertisement in the police review magazine (WD008390). In the decades prior to this application I had gained a wealth of major investigative experience.
- 6.6. I ask that you do not pigeonhole me as having only gained experience in the field of multi-fatality investigations. It is just an unfortunate fact that in three of the cases that I managed there were 36 fatalities alone. [Helicopter Crash (7 dead), Morecambe Bay Tragedy (23 dead) and one particular Honour Based Violence investigation (6 dead)] However, please do not disregard the experience that I gained during these investigations as irrelevant to Operation Rectangle. Much of the experience gained during these investigations is relevant and transferable to that operation, particularly the partnership working arrangements and victim support.

- 6.7. Over a 12-year period I had successfully led many investigations into murders involving hate crimes, honour based violence, domestic violence, sexual violence, gang violence, a serial killer, the murder of a police officer, incidents of murder/suicide and one-punch manslaughters. Should it be deemed necessary, I can produce extensive evidence that I led these investigations as the actual SIO.
- 6.8. I had also led the investigations into offences of rape, child sexual exploitation and serious sexual offences committed by paedophiles, which involved extensive research into their historic activities. My role had been intrinsically involved in the safeguarding of children; multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPA) work and I had been part of ongoing problem solving operations to protect children in care from those who attempted to sexually exploit them.
- 6.9. I had supported the work of public protection units and had been involved in serious case reviews. I had been the SIO of cases involving the murder and manslaughter of young babies. One of the last baby manslaughter cases that I managed just before being seconded to Jersey involved investigating the conduct of a carer of children over a 30-year period. Investigative experience that was entirely relevant to the investigation being conducted in Jersey.
- 6.10. I had worked at a divisional, force, regional, national and international investigative levels and had developed a wide network of SIO contacts throughout the UK. My application for the role of SIO on Operation Rectangle was motivated by a desire to investigate allegations of child abuse and to pursue prosecutions where possible.
- 6.11. The Interview Panel were aware of my experience and no doubt took this into account when considering me to be appropriate for the advertised role.

## **7. MY CHRONOLOGY**

- 7.1. Despite having viewed some of the media coverage of the excavations at Haute de la Garenne (“HDLG”) in February and March 2008, my first briefing about Operation Rectangle did not take place until 22<sup>nd</sup> August 2008, which was immediately after my interview. That briefing consisted mainly of a tour of the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) MIR, which left me with the strong impression that UK procedures had been used to manage the investigation.
- 7.2. Between 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2008 and 8<sup>th</sup> September 2008, I focused on clearing my workload in Lancashire. The interview panel were aware of such commitments and agreed that I would not be in a position to commence my role as SIO until such time that my work in Lancashire permitted me to do so. Nevertheless, I did conduct several media interviews at the request of SOJP during this period.
- 7.3. It was during these media interviews that I was told that Operation Rectangle had been operating within a hostile environment. I heard about the allegations of political interference, attempts to cover up child abuse and widespread corruption.
- 7.4. The main source of this information was the BBC’s special correspondent Mr. Robert Hall, who I first met on the morning of 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2008. He had been allowed extraordinary access to the investigation and was in the possession of leaked material and information. In my experience, this was not normal, particularly in investigations of this magnitude.
- 7.5. The BBC has editorial standards, which cover *‘Editorial integrity and independence, truth and accuracy, impartiality and diversity of opinion, fairness, harm and offence, accountability, serving the public interest and children.’*
- 7.6. I consider that Mr. Hall breached these standards by being unwilling to accept or report impartially information that I provided him with, as a response to some of his concerns. The principal issue being the subject of

lawyers working within the MIR environment. Mr. Harper had told Mr. Hall that this was suspicious behaviour that would unnecessarily allow lawyers access to intelligence.

- 7.7. I told Mr. Hall that it was common practice for lawyers to work within MIR's and in close partnership with the police. Mr. Hall did not report this information, despite being given numerous and relevant opportunities to do so. By failing to act impartially he interfered with my ability to effectively manage aspects of Operation Rectangle. I was questioned about this issue during my oral evidence.
- 7.8. If the Inquiry has any doubts about the practice of lawyers working within MIRs, there is a wealth of barristers and solicitors who can confirm this information.
- 7.9. Later the same day that I met Mr. Hall, I became the subject of untrue allegations on Senator Stuart Syvret's blog, stating I was corrupt and incompetent. Mr. Syvret at the time was described to me as the father of the house in the States of Jersey. An experienced and influential politician who had become high profile as an alleged champion fighting for the rights of child abuse victims.
- 7.10. Mr. Syvret's allegations eventually included him telling journalists that I had been paid a large sum of money to cover up the child abuse allegations within Operation Rectangle. This false allegation was fabricated by Mr. Syvret for his own self purpose. Mr. Syvret through his untrue allegations and abusive course of conduct interfered with and significantly impacted upon my ability to effectively manage aspects of Operation Rectangle.
- 7.11. Even before commencing my role, I became aware of the difficult working environment in Jersey. However, it was not until I started working in Jersey on 8<sup>th</sup> September 2008 that I was first briefed on an array of serious issues relating to the previous management of Operation Rectangle and the conduct of senior SOJP officers.

7.12. On arrival, I was provided with briefing reports and met with investigators, members of the legal team and some victims. However, the source of most of my information relating to the management of SOJP's largest ever investigation was Detective Inspector Alison Fossey. Ms. Fossey was the Deputy Senior Investigating Officer, thereby holding position of the second highest ranked officer. This was of course entirely appropriate given her vast knowledge of the investigation.

7.13. The list of extensive and important issues that I was required to manage as the SIO included, but not limited to:

7.13.1 Operation Rectangle did not have a current working terms of reference. It had been conducted as a single agency led investigation, without the recommended best practice strategic co-ordination group and normal command and control structures. The Independent Advisory Group ("IAG"), apparently used in preference to a gold group, did not understand their role whatever that was supposed to be. They had not been provided with appropriate guidance or support by SOJP. (WD008273/167).

7.13.2 Mr. Harper, the former SIO, had decided not to leave a handover report, despite being advised to do so (Day 118/51/8). He had also removed his daybooks from the MIR and did not provide these important documents for disclosure. Mr. Warcup wrote to Mr. Harper in polite terms, asking that he return these items and Mr. Harper untruthfully claimed that they did not exist (WD009398/WS000516/86). Mr. Warcup also instructed me not to speak to Mr. Harper.

7.13.3 The operation was being conducted in a silo, away from the mainstream of SOJP, which had caused an internal organisational operational rift. Valuable intelligence was not being appropriately

disseminated outside of Operation Rectangle. Ms. Fossey showed me e-mails that, as a UK SIO, my arrival was not welcomed by all SOJP senior management, and officers and staff complained to me about the internal bullying culture that existed within SOJP.

- 7.13.4 There were significant disclosure issues, as thousands of children's files had not been reviewed. By this time it was well over a year into the operation and this was an action that would normally have been completed during the early stages of the investigation.
- 7.13.5 The working relationship between the lawyers and the SOJP did not meet the standards that existed in 2008. Mr. Harper had not trusted the lawyers or the Attorney General to do their job professionally, leading to the development of a public narrative that there was an active conspiracy to cover up child abuse. I created a prosecution team approach, which was a normal operating practice. However, Mr. Harper maintained a public narrative on this issue that inferred I had joined a conspiracy, which negatively impacted on public confidence in the investigation.
- 7.13.6 SOJP's immediate release of information relating to exhibit JAR/6, which had been discovered on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2008 during the excavations at HDLG, was also highlighted to me. This item was very quickly publicly presented as the partial remains of a child and not the potential remains of a child as is outlined in a policy book entry. This release, unsurprisingly, caused a significant and high profile media reaction. The item first thought to be a small piece of a child's skull, should not have been described in this exaggerated manner. Prior to release the forensic team considered it could have been an item of infill and informed SOJP the day after its discovery that it had been found in a pre-

1940's context (WD009168). Expert examination of the item soon questioned the provisional identification and by the 9<sup>th</sup> April 2008, all experts agreed the item was not human bone and that it had been discovered in a Victorian context. SOJP did not make these findings public in a sufficiently clear manner. In fact the available evidence outlines that the SIO prevaricated in a press release, media interview (WD009166) and police report. It has been alleged that in some way I have interfered with this exhibit. That is not true; the main identification procedures were conducted months before my secondment began. Although in May 2009, I did authorise the examination of this item by internationally recognised experts, who formally confirmed that JAR/6 was in fact a small piece of coconut.

7.13.7 Formal Public Interest Immunity ("PII") disclosures had not been sent to relevant authorities about employees, who may still have had access to children, informing them that they were under investigation for child abuse offences. Additionally, guidance contained within the UK policing manual 'The investigation of historic institutional child abuse' had been recommended to SOJP but had been rejected. These recommendations such as the analytical process called the Matrix system and the Panel system for reviewing evidence in partnership with the lawyers were needed to assist in the professional management of the investigation. I therefore needed to implement them.

7.13.8 The analyst working on Operation Rectangle was not qualified to the standards of 2008 and therefore analytical product to the highest standards of the day was not available. Professional analysis of the cases under investigation revealed that many suspects were either deceased or unknown. The majority of the type of offending that was being investigated was at a considerable variance from that which had received high profile media

coverage. Early liaison should have taken place with lawyers to assist with creating the operations term of reference. There should have been greater clarity on the scope of offences to be investigated and prosecuted.

7.13.9 In relation to the cases that were already in the criminal justice process. Charges had been preferred at a far too early stage in the Gordon Wateridge case and the investigation was still very much in progress. The case was not ready to meet the rigours of the prosecution process. Michael Aubin, another defendant [REDACTED] there were questions being raised about the admissibility of his police interviews. Operation Cannon was also presented to me, which contained unique issues and problems. All of these cases were the subject of abuse of process arguments, where material I was being presented with, strengthened the arguments that would be made by the defence.

7.13.10 Between February and August of 2008, SOJP had made regular announcements declaring that they had uncovered a variety of suspicious forensic finds. These included the finding of the remains of five children, shackles, blood and pieces of bone that had been positively identified as human. Independent review of this material revealed that these claims were either untrue or items had been misrepresented or exaggerated. Bone had not been positively identified as human and dating had revealed that some of the items could better be described as unexplained or museum artifacts rather than evidential crime exhibits. I have provided you with the evidence in relation to these matters and if you have any doubts, I ask that you consider speaking to the relevant expert witnesses, rather than relying on any documentation that has been provided to you.

7.13.11 The media strategy utilised by SOJP had been successful in

encouraging a large number of victims to come forward. However, the content and amount of information released by SOJP was unlike anything I had come across in my police service. The media had been allowed access to the areas being described as cellars and they had broadcast images of these areas. At that stage of an investigation such activity is not recommended for obvious evidential reasons. Mr. Matthew Tapp who was a police media expert and again another person entirely independent of Jersey, who I had never met before, conducted a review of the SOJP media strategy. He was critical of the media strategy and formed a similar view to that of Mr. Warcup, the lawyers, myself, the Metropolitan police review team that a press conference was required to correct the inaccurate information that SOJP had allowed to enter the public domain.

7.13.12 During a tour of HDLG, I was shown around the ‘cellars’ and the restricted access and the height of the areas were pointed out to me (WD009093). Members of the Operation Rectangle investigation team told me that they doubted the allegations made by some of the alleged victims, in relation to offences supposedly committed in this area. This view had been formed during the tenure of Mr. Harper (WD009185). I am unaware of a situation where a victim was believed by the investigation team under the tenure of Mr. Harper and suddenly doubted during mine.

7.13.13 The reviews by the Metropolitan police team and the National Policing Improvement Agency forensic team revealed further wide-ranging issues. There had been no forensic strategy for the excavation at HDLG and even after the Metropolitan police team had interviewed Mr. Harper, they could not identify a proper rationale to justify the commencement of the excavations at HDLG or Victoria Tower. They considered that the searches could not be justified by the available facts. Mr. Harper later told

Wiltshire police that there was no operational reason for the excavation at Victoria Tower. These operations had been conducted at a cost of over a million pounds and in terms of accountability this issue on its own is one that clearly fell within the direct remit of the chief officer, Mr. Power.

7.13.14 In terms of financial management, although SOJP had been given a blank cheque to forward the investigation it was still incumbent on them to implement the financial management procedures that are included within the UK investigative manuals. Major investigations can be very expensive and their appropriate financial management is important, no matter how serious the offences under investigation. I ask that the Inquiry be provided with the nine financial review documents produced by BDO Alto and Mr. Michael Kellett, rather than just the summary document, which has already been made public. SOJP have declined to release them as they argue they are outside your terms of reference. These documents set out in plain English, issues of poor financial management and corrupt financial practices. I suggest that they are relevant to your terms of reference 11.

7.13.15 Complaints were made to me about SOJP having an oppressive policing style, where suspects had been arrested at an inordinately early time of the morning for no apparent operational reason. Questions were also raised about due process issues, where it appeared agreement was being sought to authorise the charge of suspects, prior to their arrest and interview.

7.14. Whilst issues arise during major investigations and mistakes can occur, the totality of the irregularities in this operation, in my view, were not within normal or expected parameters when considering the operational policing standards that existed in 2008.

## **8. CHIEF OFFICER GRAHAM POWER**

- 8.1. I had been a superintendent for 8 years before I was seconded to Jersey. During that time I had worked on a wide array of serious incidents and was accustomed to identifying issues of importance that I knew my supervisor or gold commander would wish to be informed of immediately. At times, this also included matters of such importance that it was obvious the chief constable would wish to be informed and on occasions it would become necessary to speak to them directly.
- 8.2. The role of chief constable or chief officer is therefore not a complete mystery to me. Although I do appreciate that having informed them about an issue it is up to them to decide how to deal with it.
- 8.3. I have set out in my evidence to the Inquiry the wide-ranging serious issues that were being highlighted to me from the very start of my secondment. In simple terms Mr. Power would not discuss any of these issues with me. Issues such as evidence being misrepresented, untruths being told to the media, complaints of bullying and financial mismanagement within a category A+ investigation are all issues that should quite rightly be immediately drawn to the attention of a chief officer, for obvious reasons. He was told about these matters and in my view he abrogated all responsibility for these issues and wished to have no direct involvement in their management.
- 8.4. The Wiltshire police report sets out significant evidence that Mr. Power did not perform his duties as a supervisor and chief officer to an adequate standard in relation to Operation Rectangle. He had allowed his training to become outdated and his apparent work ethic was lacking.
- 8.5. The only person that Mr. Power had direct line managerial responsibility for had told untruths to the media, mismanaged an investigation and had misused public funds, which included an excessive spend on the unnecessary entertainment of friends, colleagues and the media. As an officer holding the

rank of superintendent it was my duty to raise these serious issues or that certainly would have been expected of me when I worked in the Lancashire Constabulary. I ask you to recognise that I had a duty to report these matters under Standard 10 of the standards of professional behaviour in the police conduct regulations of 2008, which placed a statutory obligation on me to report or challenge inappropriate behaviour.

## **9. THE PRESS CONFERENCE**

- 9.1. A press conference was required to correct and clarify information that had been previously made public by SOJP. This was required to assist in the defending of the abuse of process arguments but also because it was the right thing to do. There had been church services in Jersey to pray for dead children, people were shocked and people had the right to know that items previously presented as suspicious could now be explained in a more accurate context.
- 9.2. Mr. Power has complained that the date of the November press conference was inconvenient for him because of leave. I'd like to remind this inquiry that it was also inconvenient for me, as I was the SIO of an extremely serious case in Lancashire around this same time, where I was also required to give evidence. However, through e-mails and telephone calls I was still able to provide my suggested input to the conference script. Surely Mr. Power could have availed himself of the same technology to provide necessary input, into this important matter and to keep himself updated.
- 9.3. As I said in my oral evidence (Day 111/146/13), this press conference was of key importance to SOJP and due to the extenuating circumstances that existed in Jersey the person who should have provided the lead role in the press conference was Mr. Power. I was of the opinion that it needed his involvement as the public lead in order for it to provide Operation Rectangle with the necessary momentum, to move it forward successfully.

- 9.4. Mr. Warcup felt so concerned about the conduct of Mr. Power that he submitted a report to the chief executive of the States of Jersey (WD007494). Indeed, I had placed my similar concerns in writing as far back as the 5<sup>th</sup> October 2008 (WD008082). After Mr. Power was suspended, Wiltshire police conducted a thorough investigation. Again, the officers conducting that investigation were completely independent of Jersey and were people who I did not know.
- 9.5. It is noteworthy that the evidence contained in the Wiltshire report highlights almost exactly the same serious concerns that both Mr. Warcup and I raised.
- 9.6. Central to the successful management of major investigations is teamwork both internally within the police and externally with partner agencies. The teamwork ethic was severely lacking in respect of Operation Rectangle. There was division within the SOJP and the chief officer just did not provide the necessary leadership that such an enquiry demanded, especially in light of the extraordinary circumstances that had been allowed to develop. Mr. Power's lack of involvement and engagement with Operation Rectangle interfered with my ability to effectively manage it.
- 9.7. I was not surprised that Mr. Power was suspended, however the management of that decision led to an even greater division between some politicians, police officers and victims.
- 9.8. I understand that some of the victims and their supporters take the view that the press conference was part of a concerted effort to cover up child abuse in Jersey. This was not the case. Due to the reporting that had taken place, it was, in my view, a necessity and a genuine attempt, to clarify and correct the true position.
- 9.9. Contrary to the assertions of Mr. Harper, I request that the evidence be considered which illustrates that the victims were a priority issue for me. I doubled the size of the victim support team and ensured that individually tailored care packages were created for each victim. I put a great deal of effort

into supporting the Victim Liaison Officers (“VLO”) team and visited some victims myself. I even invited some victims into the MIR to speak to the officers that were investigating their allegations. There is documentation within the MIR that will evidence the scope of the work that I was involved with. I engaged with highly regarded international experts at the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (“CEOP”) to assist with the enquiry and to provide training to officers working on the investigation.

9.10. I did not attempt to close down Operation Rectangle inappropriately. As part of the planning process I recommended to SOJP that they engage with CEOP to assist in providing best practice as part of any exit strategy. Early engagement over such an issue is common sense because Operation Rectangle could have closed down at any time for a variety of reasons and it was necessary to be ready for such an event. Also, witnesses involved in trials would require exit strategy support at the conclusion of their particular case.

9.11. This issue was raised with me during my oral evidence. I suggest that in any other working environment other than Jersey, the consideration of using CEOP to develop an exit strategy would be evidence that I was thinking about the long term care of victims, but in Jersey some consider it, quite wrongly, to be evidence of a cover-up.

9.12. I had been presented with serious problems from the moment I commenced work in Jersey, well above and beyond what could be regarded as acceptable and normal. Many of these issues had been created unnecessarily by SOJP deciding not to use experienced people and recommended best practice. If I had ignored these issues I could quite rightly be accused of covering up wrongdoing. However, in dealing with them I have found myself accused of being part of a conspiracy to cover-up child abuse.

9.13. I reported what I had been presented with and acted in accordance with my understanding of best practice guidance. I created a term of reference via a gold group, worked in partnership with lawyers, supported an IAG, assisted

in updating a Community Impact Assessment and implemented the best practice Matrix and Panel systems. I employed a fully trained analyst and conducted the investigation to the standards of 2008. This included attending daily meetings, investigative senior management meetings, finance meetings, VLO meetings and legal meetings. I also implemented effective financial management.

- 9.14. One ancillary issue that I wish to mention is the recommendations emanating from the MacPherson report. Mr. Power and Mr. Harper argue that they do not relate to Jersey, as it does not have community racial tensions. I ask that you show due caution in relation to this issue, particularly if you intend to make comment on it within your report. There are no special major investigation procedures to deal with black people or ethnic minority communities, as has been suggested.
- 9.15. The procedures are there to respond to every type of communities concern and the comments from these two senior officers do not reflect my understanding of the MacPherson recommendations and some people may, quite rightly, take genuine offence to what has been inferred.
- 9.16. I worked extremely hard during my secondment to Jersey. The evidence of the way the investigation progressed under my command has been made available to you. Thorough investigations were conducted into the complaints and where appropriate people were charged and victims were supported through the trial process.
- 9.17. The legal team did not act corruptly and they also worked extremely hard. They considered the evidence presented to them and made the prosecution decisions in a professional manner. SOJP should have worked in partnership with the lawyers, from the beginning of the Operation and assisted in the presentation of accurate but nevertheless unpopular information to victims. Instead, a media storm was created that inferred the Jersey legal system and those working within it were corrupt.

9.18. I consider that some people who were disenchanted with the political system in Jersey, including some politicians and police officers, inappropriately used the child abuse investigation to forward their own personal aims and prejudices. The working environment was toxic and I received inadequate personal and professional support to assist me through an extremely challenging time of my police career. In particular, I was disappointed with the performance of a number of officers holding ACPO rank and the Home Affairs minister, Mr. Ian Le Marquand.

## **10. CONCLUSION**

10.1. This Inquiry inevitably raised a number of issues between those involved in Operation Rectangle. It is not for me to determine these issues.

10.2. Throughout Operation Rectangle, it is my view, that whilst every attempt was made by me and others to investigate, this was hampered by the conduct of others.

10.3. I trust that you will consider the various allegations in light of the strength of the evidence presented to you during the course of this Inquiry.

10.4. I am grateful to the Inquiry for allowing me an opportunity to put forward, by way of my statements and today, my position in relation to those matters concerning Operation Rectangle.

10.5. I wish you success in being able to provide answers to your terms of reference and hope your conclusions assist in providing some level of closure for victims and in ensuring the future safety of all children who live in and visit Jersey.

10.6. Unless I can assist the Inquiry further, I have nothing to add.